John Stuart Mill
devoted most of his famous account to explaining why freedom of discussion is
important. The general idea is that
truth is a casualty of the suppression of free discussion. Pressing more is
when this freedom may be limited, though freedom of discussion was widely
accepted even in Mill’s own day, he thinks that the arguments for it are not
widely appreciated.
Mill as an
utilitarian rejects the idea of natural rights, and emphasizes that society as
a whole, not just the silenced individual, loses by the state of possible
subjugation of free discussion.
In effect there are
three arguments that are attached to three possible scenarios.
In the first,
argument, he imagines that a majority who share a certain view seek to silence
the minority who disagree. He further supposes that the majority view is false,
as it happens, it makes the minority view true. Mill argues that in these
circumstances it is catastrophic to silence the minority, disastrous for the majority, that is, because there is
now no means of releasing it from its belief in a fallacious reasoning. If
however the minority remains free to express its doubts about the majority
view, then there is a chance that the majority will be brought to see the
falsity of its view.
The second
scenario is the same as the first except that this time the majority view is
true and the minority view false. Here a concern for truth might seem to
support silencing the minority since its view is false. Bottling fallacy
doubtlessly supports truth. However, he argues that if the majority silences
its opponents, it will never have to defend its belief and over time will
forget the arguments for it.
Mill’s third
scenario involves both parties of opinion, majority and minority, having a
portion of the truth but not the whole of it. He regards this as the most
common of the three scenarios, and his argument here is very simple. To enlarge
its grasp of the truth the majority must allow the minority to express its
halfway truthful view.
On assessment of
the case, the first and third of Mill’s arguments are the most persuasive. If
the majority view is wholly or partially false, then allowing critical
discussion surely enhances the chances of truth replacing error. But if the
majority view is already true, as in the second argument, allowing critical
discussion does involve risk.
Majorities, he
says will always think that they are in the second scenario, where the case for
allowing critical discussion is weakest. They, like anyone else, will always
take their beliefs to be true. Thinking a belief true is a condition of having
it. Mill supposes, that we can never be certain that our beliefs are true, his
position is that we can never have the degree of certainty that would warrant
silencing criticism of our beliefs. That would be to claim infallibility for
ourselves. If however we allow our beliefs to be criticized but no persuasive
criticism is forthcoming, that gives us sufficient certainty to warrant our
acting upon the beliefs.
When we come to the political, moral and
religious cases where that temptation is real, then it is much more plausible
to think, with Mill, that we cannot have certainty of the sort required to
justify the abbreviation of debate. For in these cases there are always
contemplation on both sides of the argument which have to be balanced.
